Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication is automatic identification, or identity verification, of individuals using behavioural and/or physiological characteristics @I. There is increasing interest in biometric authentication, especially in the context of heightened interest in national security since the attacks of September 11, 2001 . Technologies such as Automatic Face Recognition, Fingerprint and Iris identification, are being piloted or implemented at airports, for government identification systems such as passports and drivers licenses, and in surveillance applications, In this paper, we consider the identifiability of stored biometric information, and its implications for biometric privacy and security.
Biometric authentication is typically performed by a sophisticated software application, which manages the user interface and database, and interacts with a vendor specific, proprietary biometric algorithm. Algorithms undertake the following processing steps: 1) acquisition of a biometric sample image, 2) conversion of the sample image to a biometric template, 3) comparison of the new (or "live") template to previously stored templates, to calculate a match score. High match scores indicate a likelihood that the corresponding images are from the same individual. The biometric template is a (typically vendor specific) compact digital representation of the essential features of the sample image. Biometric algorithm vendors have uniformly claimed that it is impossible or infeasible to recreate the image from the template. [2, 3, 4, 71 These claims are supported by: 1) the template records features (such as fmgerprint minutiae) and not image primitives, 2) templates are typically calculated using only a small portion of the image, 3) templates are small -a few hundred bytesmuch smaller than the sample image, and 4) the proprietary nature of the storage format makes templates infeasible to "hack. For these reasons, biometric templates are considered to be effectively nm-identifiable data, much like a password hash [7] . In fact, these arguments are not valid: this paper demonstrates a simple algorithm to recreate sample images from templates using only match score results.
METHODS
A software application (figure 1) was designed with the goal of recreating a face image of a specific person in a face recognition database. The application has local access to a database of face images, and has network access to a Face Recognition Server W S ) The pseudocode of the application is shown in figure 2 , involving the following steps: preprosessing, starting point det-ation, and image optimization. Initially, all that is available to the application is the person ID (PID) in the database of the FRS. During preprocessing, images in the local database are rotated, scaled and cropped, such that all images have the same size (150x200 pixels) and eye locations (50.90 and 100,90). Subsequently the image database was decomposed to calculate the first 300 eigenimages (also called principle components or eigenfaces) [5] . The application then determines the match score for all images in the local database against the PJD. The initial estimate is selected to be the image with the highest match score. Subsequently, the initial estimate is improved as follows: for each iteration, an eigenimage is selected, and a series of image produc:ed equal to the current image estimate plus a small constant times the eigenimage. Ihe correspondlng match scores are calculated, and the image with the best score is selected for the subsequent iteration. This process is repeated until there is no significant improvement in match score. Using 6 levels at each iteration, the algorithm stabilized after about 2500 iterations. 
RESULTS

DISCUSSION
An algorithm is presented which is able to substantially recreate the image of a person from the face recognition template. The only information required is the identity of the target template and the ability to calculate the match score between this template and an arbitrary image. The images calculated using the procedure are of sufficient quality to: 1) masquerade to the algorithm as the target, and 2) give a good visual impression of the person's characteristics.
This algorithm is not particularly sensitive to its details. Initial images that are visually distinct from the target converge to a good estimate; except for an increased calculation time. The minimization algorithm presented is simple and quite inefficient. There exist many more sophisticated multidimensional minimization algorithms, which could presumably produce an image with less match score computations. The requirement for the algorithm is that it not be sensitive to local minima. The most important consideration is a g o d choice of basis functions. For face recognition, the eigenimage basis performs well, while basis functions with spatial discontinuities did not. In order to extend this technique to fingerprint recognition, where biometric features are spatially localized, a different type of basis functions would be required.
This technique could potentially be used in several real world scenarios. Recreation of a look-alike sample image is possible, and could be used to masquerade as the target or to identify them. For example, if an agency is allowed to compare their records against a biometric database of wanted persons, it would be possible for the agency to recalculate images of these persons. However, this approach does not allow exact recreation of the target image. This is not surprising, as the template typically contains significantly less data than the original image.
Recently, Hill [6] has shown that the templates from a fingerprint algorithm can be "hacked" in such a way as to allow synthetic images to be generated which would fool the algorithm to consider them the same as the original image. This work differs from the technique of Hill [6], in wbicb the structure of a fingerprint template was expertly analysed. Firstly, access to the template storage is not required. This implies that enrryption of the template [7] , as proposed to counter the technique of Hill, will not work. Additionally, this algorithm does not require significant technical expertise to analyse a proprietary file format. Unlike a well designed encryption system, where the presented password is either correct or not, a biometric match score provides measure of closeness.
It is this information which allows an initial guess to be gradually refined until it matches the target.
In conclusion, we have developed an algorithm by which an image of a person may be reconstructed from face recognition biometric match score results. ?%e simplicity of this algorithm suggests that it be extensible to other biometric modalities. The implication in terms of privacy and security is that access to biometric results can effectively allow access to identifiable source images.
